State of Utah v. James Harleston Linden : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1987
State of Utah v. James Harleston Linden : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David Wilkinson; Attorney General; Sanra L. Sjogren; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Respondent.
Elliott Levine; Summit County Public Defender; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, State of Utah v. James Harleston Linden, No. 870389.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1987).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1745
Ui*» ** 
* * £ 1 
- ; n 
DOCKET NO. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
JAMES HARLESTON LINDEN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 870389 
Priority 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION OF AGGRAVATED 
ROBBERY, A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION 
OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-302 (SUPP. 1987), 
THEFT, A SECOND DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION 
OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-404 (SUPP. 1987), 
AND POSSESSION OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON, A THIRD 
DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 76-10-503 (SUPP. 1987), IN THE THIRD 
DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE HOMER F. 
WILKINSON, PRESIDING. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
SANDRA L. 
Assistant 
236 State 
Salt Lake 
SJOGREN 
Attorney General 
Capitol 
City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
ELLIOTT LEVINE 
Summit County Public Defender 
4168 South 1785 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
Attorney for Appellant 
F I L E D 
JUN 1 / 1938 
gb& SvyW* Court. Wall 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
JAMES HARLESTON LINDEN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 870389 
Priority 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION OF AGGRAVATED 
ROBBERY, A FIRST DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION 
OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-302 (SUPP. 1987), 
THEFT, A SECOND DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION 
OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-404 (SUPP. 1987), 
AND POSSESSION OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON, A THIRD 
DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. 
S 76-10-503 (SUPP. 1987) , IN THE THIRD 
DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE HOMER F. 
WILKINSON, PRESIDING. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
SANDRA L. SJOGREN 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
ELLIOTT LEVINE 
Summit County Public Defender 
4168 South 1785 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
Attorney for Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 4 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE 
OF TRIAL 5 
POINT II DEFENDANT FAILS TO SUPPORT THE 
ALLEGATIONS OF IMPROPRIETY DURING 
JURY SELECTION. THEREFORE, HIS 
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND CONSTITU-
TIONAL VIOLATION CLAIMS ARE GROUNDLESS 6 
-ii-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
State v. Brooks. 563 P.2d 799 (Utah 1977) 9 
State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750 (Utah 1982) 5-6 
State v. Miller. 727 P.2d 203 (Utah 1986) 7 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-302 (Supp. 1987) 2 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (Supp. 1987) 2 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-503 (Supp. 1987) 2 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-18 (Supp. 1987) 9 
Utah Code Ann. S 78-2-2(3) (h) (1987) 1 
-iii-
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondenti 
vs. 
JAMES HARLESTON LINDEN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 870389 
Priority 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of aggravated robbery, 
a first degree felony, theft, a second degree felony and 
possession of a dangerous weapon, a third degree felony, in the 
Third District Court. This Court has jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal under Utah Code Ann. S 78-2-2(3)(h) (1987). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court erred in denying 
defendants motion for continuance of trial which was based on 
his alleged need to contact out-of-state witnesses regarding his 
defense. 
2. Whether the trial court commited reversible error 
in failing to £M& sponte disqualify venire persons who defendant 
alleges have business and personal relationships with the county 
attorney. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with Aggravated 
Robberyf a first degree felony, theft, a second degree felony and 
Possession of a Dangerous Weapon, a third degree felony in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302, 76-6-404 and 76-10-503 
(Supp. 1987). 
A jury convicted defendant of all three counts on 
September 10, 1987, in the Third Judicial District Court, in and 
for Summit County, State of Utah, the Honorable Homer F. 
Wilkinson, presiding. Judge Wilkinson sentenced defendant on 
September 17, 1987, to one indeterminate term of five years to 
life, one indeterminate term of one to fifteen years, and one 
indeterminate terra of zero to five years, all terms to run 
concurrently, and one indeterminate term of five to ten years 
with a minimum mandatory term of five years, to run consecutively 
with the other sentences imposed. In addition, Judge Wilkinson 
ordered restitution by defendant on the amount of $100,000 to 
Suttons of Park City. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 18, 1987, an information was filed in the Third 
District Court, Summit County, charging defendant with aggravated 
robbery, theft, and possession of a firearm. All charges arose 
from the robbery of Suttons of Park City, a fine jewelry store in 
Park City, Utah. 
Defendant was arraigned on those charges on July 9, 
1987, and a trial date was set for September 24, 1987. On August 
18, 1987, the trial date was reset for September 9, 1987, and 
defendant was properly notified (R. 22). 
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On September If two weeks after the notice of the new 
trial date and one week before the trial, defendant filed a 
motion for continuance of his trial (R. 27-28) . He renewed the 
motion at the pre-trial hearing of September 8, 1987 (R. 33-38), 
and again, during trial (Tr. 3, 272). Each time defendant 
claimed the need of time to contact alleged witnesses in his 
defense. The court denied each motion. 
At trialr the State introduced testimony of witnesses 
who identified defendant as the perpetrator of the Suttons 
robbery. One witness, an employee of Suttons, testified that 
defendant held her at gunpoint and demanded several items of 
jewelry (Tr. 24-30). 
Two days after the robbery defendant and Sara Linden, 
whom he represented as his wife, bought a 1981 Corvette, paying 
$11,677 in cash for it (Tr. 119-24, 137). Defendant had the car 
registered in Ms. Linden's name saying he had either an insurance 
or driver's license problem (T. 124, 137). Defendant appeared 
extremely anxious to complete the transaction and leave the 
dealership (T. 140-41) . It is unusual for a car dealer to 
receive currency in payment for a car, and the salesman could not 
recall any other person paying in full in cash in his ten years 
of experience (T. 141, 153). 
Sara Linden, defendant's sister-in-law, testified that 
defendant told her his career was doing robberies (T. 202). 
Defendant mentioned Suttons robbery as one of the locations he 
had robbed (T. 203). On the day of the robbery, defendant had a 
briefcase full of jewelry that he showed Ms. Linden (T. 203-04). 
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Defendant told her she should not know where the jewelry came 
from (T. 205) . Some of the items had price tags on them, but no 
store name (T. 206) . Some time later, defendant said Suttons was 
an easy target and he would like to do "it" again (T. 209). Ms. 
Linden accompanied defendant to buy the Corvette which defendant 
put in her name saying she was his wife (T. 210)• Some pieces of 
jewelry that were recovered from Ms. Linden were identified as 
having come from Suttons (T. 82, 175, 207). Ms. Linden said 
defendant gave them to her (T. 207) . 
The jury convicted defendant of all charges on 
September 10, 1987 (R. 105-107). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Defendant's claim of error based on the trial 
court's refusal to grant him a continuance is meritless. While 
he repeatedly alleged the need to contact witnesses, defendant 
fails to set forth the alleged witnesses' names, the subject 
matter of their testimony, or the admissibility of such 
testimony. In general, defendant failed to show the trial court 
and he fails to show on appeal that his alleged need for a 
continuance was anything more than a sham. 
2. Defendant's claim of error based on the alleged 
improper jury selection lacks support from either the record or 
Utah law. Absent the jury selection record on appeal, the Court 
cannot establish the accuracy of defendant's claims or the 
correctness of the trial court's conduct. In addition, 
defendant's arguments mistakenly assume that the court has a duty 
to act filia sponte during jury selection, disqualifying jurors in 
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favor of either party. Absent any record showing defendant's 
timely objection to each particular juror's presence in the jury 
and the trial court's response to the challenge/ this Court must 
assume that the trial court acted within its sound discretion. 
ARGUMENT 
PQXNT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE OF TRIAL. 
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying defendant's motions for continuance. In 
support of his claimf defendant cites Alaska and Nevada case lawr 
completely ignoring well-established Utah law. 
In State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750 (Utah 1982)/ this 
Court set forth the law governing the granting of trial 
continuances in Utah. This Court stated: 
It is well established in Utah/ as elsewhere/ 
that the granting of a continuance is at the 
discretion of the trial judgef whose decision 
will not be reversed by this Court absent a 
clear abuse of that discretion. Abuse may be 
found where a party made timely objections/ 
given necessary notice/ and made a 
reasonable effort to have the trial date 
reset for good cause. 
Id,, at 752 (citations omitted). 
Particularly relevant to the instant case are the 
requirements set forth in Creviston, which a criminal defendant 
must satisfy when moving for a continuance: 
When a defendant in a criminal action moves 
for a continuance in order to procure the 
testimony of an absent witness/ such a 
defendant must show that the testimony sought 
is material and admissible/ that the witness 
could actually be produced, that the witness 
could be produced within a reasonable time. 
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and that due diligence has been exercised 
before the request for a continuance. 
Id, at 752. In the instant case, defendant contends over and 
over again that he was not given enough time to contact the 
alleged witnesses. However, defendant completely fails to 
indicate the subject matter of the alleged witnesses1 testimony, 
much less whether the testimony would be admissible. He fails to 
establish a time frame within which he may contact and bring 
those witnesses to Utah. In fact, defendant even fails to name 
the mysterious witnesses in his defense. Moreover, while 
claiming that he could not contact the witnesses because he was 
in the Salt Lake County jail, defendant fails to explain why he 
could not contact them through his attorney. 
Defendant's complete lack of support for his contended 
need for a continuance together with the strong case against him 
as set forth in the statement of facts demonstrate that 
defendant's claim on this point is groundless. Therefore, the 
court correctly denied defendant's motion for a continuance. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO SUPPORT THE ALLEGATIONS 
OF IMPROPRIETY DURING JURY SELECTION. 
THEREFORE, HIS ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION CLAIMS ARE 
GROUNDLESS. 
Defendant's arguments in Point II and III of his 
appellate brief are purely conjectural, lacking support from 
either the record or Utah law. The allegations as to certain 
business and social relationships between some of the venire 
persons and the prosecutor and state witnesses are not 
substantiated by the record or any additional evidence. In 
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addition, defendant's claim of abuse of discretion by the trial 
court has no support in the record on appeal. 
Without transcripts of the jury voir dire and jury 
selection, it is not possible to determine the accuracy of 
defendant's claims. This Court should not consider defendant's 
allegations of prejudice that are based on matters outside the 
record on appeal. As this Court held in State v. Miller, 727 
P.2d 203, 204 (Utah 1986): 
If an appellant fails to provide an adequate 
record on appeal, this Court must assume the 
regularity of the proceedings below. 
(Citations omitted.) 
There is no support in the record for defendant's claim that the 
alleged relationships exist, nor is there support for defendant's 
allegations of abuse of discretion. Therefore, this court must 
assume regularity and rely on the trial court's discretion below. 
Even if this Court reviews defendant's allegations 
absent the record of jury selection, defendant's claims of error 
are not supported by Utah law. Defendant insists that the trial 
court abused its discretion in allowing three venire persons to 
sit as jurors. Disregarding Utah law to the contrary, defendant 
seems to assume that the trial court is obligated, sua sponte, to 
disqualify those jurors whom he later decides were biased. Under 
Utah law, any challenge to the qualifications of a particular 
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juror must be initiated by the complaining party.1 Accordingly, 
the moving party must state the grounds for challenge on the 
record. Only after the moving party's action and after hearing 
the parties1 arguments, if necessary, will the court decide 
whether the venire person should be excused for cause. In the 
instant case, defendant fails to show or even argue that he has 
complied with the statutory requirements. Defendant bases his 
1
 Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-18: 
(c) A challenge may be made to the panel or to an individual 
juror. 
(1) The panel is a list of jurors called to serve at a 
particular court or for the trial of a particular action. A 
challenge to the panel is an objection made to all jurors 
summoned and may be taken by either party. 
(i) A challenge to the panel can be founded only on a 
material departure from the procedure prescribed with respect to 
the selection, drawing, summoning and return of the panel. 
(ii) The challenge to the panel shall be taken before the 
jury is sworn and shall be in writing or recorded by the 
reporter. It shall specifically set forth the facts constituting 
the grounds of the challenge. 
(iii) If a challenge to the panel is opposed by the adverse 
party, a hearing may be had to try any question of fact upon 
which the challenge is based. The jurors challenged, and any 
other persons, may be called as witnesses at the hearing thereon. 
(iv) The court shall decide the challenge. If the challenge 
to the panel is allowed, the court shall discharge the jury so 
far as the trial in question is concerned. If a challenge is 
denied, the court shall direct the selection of jurors to 
proceed. 
(2) A challenge to an individual juror may be either 
peremptory or for cause. A challenge to an individual juror may 
be made only before the jury is sworn to try the action, except 
the court may, for good cause, permit it to be made after the 
juror is sworn but before any of the evidence is presented. In 
challenges for cause the rules relating to challenges to a panel 
and hearings thereon shall apply. All challenges for cause shall 
be taken first by the prosecution and then by the defense. 
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of prejudice but fails to establish any such relationship which 
renders the jurors lacking in fairness and impartiality. 
Defendant had a fair and impartial trial and therefore/ this 
Court should affirm his conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests t h i s Court 
to affirm defendant's conv ic t i on . 
DATED t h i s /o day of . UtCSV't , 1988. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
ney General 
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